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One of the objectives of the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity is to create access to
genetic resources and bene￿t-sharing (ABS) systems that incorporate the environmental, social,
and economic aspects of sustainable development. Under the Convention, governments have
sovereignty over their genetic resources but also the responsibility of using them sustainably.
This provision is particularly relevant for biologically-abundant developing countries as it o￿ers
a direct means of reducing the ￿nancial pressures against conservation of ecosystems and natural
habitats, particularly in light of recent. This paper examines the impacts of a bene￿t-sharing
system involving royalties and governmental ownership of genetic resources in a two-￿rm research
and development (R&D) market with uncertainty and information spillovers. Royalties are
shown to reduce the research output of the taxed ￿rm, which results in much lower expected
government revenues when the research output of a competing ￿rm is a strategic subsitute
relative to when it is a strategic complement. Further, taxation alone is generally inferior to
a combination of taxation/subsidization of successful products and research costs. The paper
shows that subsidization rather than taxation of successful products may even be optimal under
particular types of uncertainty.
JEL Classi￿cations: Q3, Q38, H41
Keywords: Biodiversity prospecting, research and development (R&D), uncertainty, spillovers,
imperfect competition.
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11 Introduction
Biodiversity preservation, or the protection of variety among species, is of signi￿cant concern to
many governments, but is particularly relevant to the developing world. While individuals may
derive bene￿ts from species and their diversity, the public good aspect of these resources makes it
di￿cult to ￿nance the costs of conservation. In order to mitigate the adverse e￿ects of the free good
(or public good) nature of biological resources on their conservation and sustainable use, initiatives
have been undertaken since the early 1990s, including the Convention on Biological Diversity (with
188 States and the European Community since it opened for signature at the Earth Summit in Rio
de Janiero, Brazil, in 1992), to create access to genetic resources and bene￿t-sharing (ABS) systems
that would incorporate the environmental, social, and economic aspects of sustainable development.
One of the aims of these initiatives, and particularly of the Convention, is the use of the economic
incentives created by the potential commercial value of genetic resources towards the conservation
of these same resources. More speci￿cally, in acknowledging the principle of ownership according
to which genetic resources are recognized to be the property of those nations in whose sovereign
territories they are located, the Convention provides that, when a biological resource is used for a
commercial application, the country of origin of such a resource has the right to bene￿t.1
Under the Convention, governments are responsible for developing national biodiversity strate-
gies and action plans integrating the objectives of consersation and sustainable use of biodiversity.
In order to achieve these goals, governments would need to consider the goods and services provided
by biodiversity and promote activities that ensure an equitable sharing of the bene￿ts from such
goods and services. These bene￿ts could include monetary payments, samples of what is collected,
transfer of biotechnology equipment and know-how, and shares of any pro￿ts from the use of the
resource. Sharing in the pro￿ts is of particular relevance as it provides a direct means for supporting
conservation. Extracting rents from biodiversity prospecting, or investigating natural sources for
commercially valuable pharmaceutical products or biotechnology, is indeed a method for ￿nancing
the conservation of biological resources that has been gaining in popularity of use. The provision
1The objectives of the Convention as set out in article 1 are \the conservation of biological diversity, the sus-
tainable use of its components, and the fair and equitable sharing of the bene￿ts arising out of the utilization
of genetic resources, including by appropriate access to generic resources and by appropriate transfer of relevant
technologies, taking into account all rights over those resources and to technologies, and by appropriate funding"
(http://www.cbd.int/convention/convention.shtml).
1that nations have sovereignty over their genetic resources but also the responsibility for conserving
their biological resources and for using them in a sustainable manner is especially important for
developing countries. \In situ" conservation of ecosystems and natural habitats is quite expensive
in terms of both preservation costs and the lost alternative use of land; if biodiversity prospecting
were a substantial and continual revenue generator for governments, the pressures against conser-
vation in developing countries, where biological resources are in abundance but economic growth
and biodiversity preservation are perceived as being much more incompatible objectives than in
developed countries,2 could be lessened through compensation for lost opportunity costs. A number
of pharmaceutical companies (including some of the world’s largest) and agencies have explored or
are currently examining species for potential new products, as seed ￿rms in agriculture have been
doing for many years. In 1993, most of the top 150 prescription drugs used in the U.S. (79 percent)
were nature-inspired compounds, semisynthetics and their analogs, and natural products or chem-
icals found in nature (Fanning, 1995). Correspondingly, a number of governments, particularly
in developing countries, have o￿ered private ￿rms the opportunity to sample species from within
their borders in return for a share of the revenues (royalty) from any products resulting from the
research.
South Africa, for example, which is one of the most biologically diverse countries in the world,
has been attempting to implement some of the Convention’s principles through its 2003 National
Environmental Management: Biodiversity Bill.3 Chapter 6 of this Bill is of particular interest
for the purpose of this paper as it is intended to regulate bioprospecting of genetic resources
through a permit system and ensure that the bene￿ts arising from the commercialization through
bioprospecting of traditional uses or knowledge of indigenous biological resources are equitably
shared with persons or communities practising these traditional uses or knowledge. In 1995, the
Philippines adopted a Presidential Executive Order (EO 247) to regulate bioprospecting which has
laid down three essential conditions for those interested in prospecting for biological resources in
the Philippines, namely, (1) a research agreement with the government, (2) prior informed consent,
and (3) sharing of bene￿ts with local communities and indigenous peoples.4 In 1996, the Andean
2For example, 70 percent of the 3,000 species known to have anti-cancer properties are found in tropical forests
(Sedjo, 1992).
3See http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/bills/2003/b30d-03.pdf.
4The minimum terms of a research agreement include: (1) a limit on the samples to be collected and exported;
(2) a complete set of all speciments; (3) access to collected specimens and relevant data deposited abroad; (4)
2Community, consisting of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela, adopted Decision 391
establishing a legal framework for bioprospecting which tries to ensure the sharing of the bene￿ts
derived from ABS-related activities with the countries where genetic resources and biologically
derived materials are collected.5 In 1998, Costa Rica, the country with the most documented
experience implementing bioprospecting projects,6 enacted the Law of Biodiversity No. 7788 which,
unlike other ABS laws and policies, requires bioprospectors to invest a percentage of their research
budget (up to 10%) and royalties (up to 50%) directly in the areas where genetic resources are
collected.7 In Mexico, Articles 87 and Article 87 BIS of the 1988 Ecological Equilibrium and
Environmental Protection General Act (EEEPGA), which were introduced in the 1996 reform of
the act, regulate ABS issues; speci￿cally, these articles incorporate the three main principles stated
in the Convention on Biological Diversity, namely, prior informed consent, mutually agreed terms,
and bene￿t sharing, but do not provide guidelines as to how these principles can be implemented.8
Several studies have previously suggested that biodiversity prospecting can be used as a poten-
tial tool for conservation, such as Farnsworth and Soejarto (1985), Principe (1989), Wilson (1992),
Reid et al. (1993), and Rubin and Fish (1994). Another subsequent branch of the literature
has questioned the e￿ectiveness of such a tool, citing either low private values of the \marginal"
species (Simpson et al., 1996) or low royalty revenues to source governments (Barbier and Aylward,
1996).9 Using the same numerical examples employed by Simpson et al. (1996) but amending the
analysis to account for the importance of information rents for promising leads, Rausser and Small
(2000) have however suggested much greater economic bene￿ts from bioprospecting than previ-
ously derived ($9,200 per hectare of western Ecuador or roughly 450 times greater than the value
calculated by Simpson et al.). Furthermore, with the development of better ways of examining
information about any commercial product derived from the activities; (5) provision for payments in terms of
royalties and other compensation in cases of commerical use; (6) trasfer of equipment; (7) prospecting fee; (8)
trasfer of technology for commercial use in cases of endemic species (http://www.chanrobles.com/eo247.htm or
http://biodiv.org/doc/measures/abs/msr-abs-ph1-en.pdf).
5See http://www.comunidadandina.org/INGLES/normativa/D391e.htm.
6The initial agreement that triggered subsequent ones was actuallly signed in 1991 between the Instituto Nacional
de Biodiversidad in Costa Rica (INBio) and a major pharmaceutical company (Merck & Co.). This agreement
remains one of the most successful
7See http://www.grain.org/brl ￿les/costarica-biodiversitylaw-1998-en.pdf.
8The 1999 Wildlife General Act and the 2003 Sustainable Forestry Development General Act include ABS provi-
sions that apply speci￿cally to wildlife and forest resources, respectively.
9Private values typically ignore non-use values or non-excludable use values. Contingent valuation and travel
cost studies of estimating existence and option values for di￿erent environmental amenities, such as Pearce (1990),
Barbier et al. (1994) or Brown and Henry (1993), suggest that social values not included in private decisions may be
signi￿cant.
3and using genetic resources in the agriculture, pharmaceutical, and biotechnology industries (e.g.,
high-throughput analysis, combinatorial chemistry, bioinformatics, and genomics), the economic
value of the information contained in their genes and biochemical compounds has been increasing
(Carrizosa et al., 2004). New methods of bioprospecting which rely upon combining databases
of natural history with ecological and evolutionary theory have recently been applied to many
industries outside pharmaceuticals, including biological control, bioremediation, construction en-
gineering, shipping, environmental monitoring, mining, industrial materials, manufacturing, and
environmental restoration.10 Although an assessment of their impacts is premature, these new de-
velopments are expected to increase the economic bene￿ts of bioprospecting in the future as more
species are identi￿ed as useful, thus potentially increasing the frequency of lead discovery.
In light of the above, the implications of uncertainty and spillovers for a bene￿t-sharing system
involving royalties and governmental ownership of genetic resources are examined in the context of
a two-￿rm, two-country model of research and development. As below shown, the e￿ectiveness of
taxes/royalties depends on the nature of the uncertainty in the research and development process,
which manifests itself through the strategic complementarity or substitutability of the ￿rms’ re-
search expenditures. The relationship between royalties and other surplus extraction methods is
examined in a model where two prospecting ￿rms compete through R&D for the same product
(prize). One ￿rm uses samples from a country with the government planning the surplus extrac-
tion, while the other is not subject to any intervention. The R&D output of both ￿rms is subject
to outcome uncertainty and information spillovers.
2 The Model
Biodiversity prospecting is an example of R&D and is thus subject to competition among ￿rms;
accordingly, the model presented here is related to the literature on strategic R&D and trade
theory.11 More speci￿c to this paper, Brander and Spencer (1983), Dixit (1984), Spencer and
Brander (1994), and Eaton and Grossman (1986) consider international R&D competition under
certainty, examining price and quantity competition by two or more ￿rms. Bagwell and Staiger
10Such sampling of ecosystems for potential drugs, which represents a major advance on the traditional pharmaceu-
tical protocols, has been referred to as ecologically driven drug discovery, biorational approach, or hypothesis-driven
drug discovery (Beattie and Ehrlich, 2004; Coley et al., 2003).
11Brander (1995) provides a survey of this literature.
4(1992, 1994) add uncertainty in production costs while Muniagurria and Singh (1997) and Leahy
and Neary (1999) introduce spillovers.12 In a framework most closely related to the one adopted in
this paper, Zhou (2002) combines both uncertainty and spillovers in R&D. In the context of a two-
￿rm R&D model with uncertainty and information spillovers, the present study considers the design
of an access and bene￿t sharing arrangement, with emphasis on the bene￿t sharing instruments
or regulations, in a country that has control over its genetic resources and wishes to stimulate
bioprospecting by a private ￿rm in order to support the e￿ective management and conservation
of its biodiversity. Aside from the application, the present analysis di￿ers from previous work in
the nature of the government objective function. Each of the studies above is in fact concerned
with the welfare of the ￿rm (industrial policy) as opposed to rent extraction; governments in the
noted literature could run de￿cits in order to encourage R&D spending to improve welfare, which
a government interested in raising funds for biodiversity protection would clearly not do.
Two risk-neutral ￿rms are assumed to be selecting their respective levels of R&D input in
the hope of creating a new pharmaceutical or biotechnology product. One ￿rm purchases its
R&D input (also referred to as sampling intensity) from outside the country in question and is
not subject to any rent extraction policy. The other ￿rm purchases its input from the country
concerned with pro￿ting from its biodiversity and applying such pro￿ts to conservation. The value
(net of production costs) of a successful product is constant at ￿ v, but the outcome depends on the
rank order and not on the absolute di￿erence between expenditures. In this way, only the ￿rm
with the higher R&D level receives this amount, while the losing ￿rm receives no return (this value
arises from the exclusive monopoly pro￿ts gained from perfect patent protection on the product
for a ￿nite period). Sampling and testing for viable products has a cost to the ￿rms which depends
on the number of species sampled, c(s), with c0 > 0 and c00 > 0. For simplicity, the probability of
￿nding multiple successful products is assumed to be zero.
Although the foreign ￿rm is not subject to government intervention, we consider two di￿erent
ways the domestic ￿rm can be taxed. The ￿rst is to place a royalty on the value of a successful
product, if found, which has been the common method used in recent biodiversity prospecting
contracts (e.g., the INBio-Merck agreement in Costa Rica and the Astra Zeneca agreement in
Queensland, Australia). When this is the only instrument employed, the royalty (t) is shown to
12Coe and Helpman (1995) show that international R&D spillovers are quite signi￿cant.
5always be positive (tax) and never negative (subsidy), as the tax serves to reduce the reward earned
from R&D. A second instrument considered here is a tax or subsidy on each unit of the input (p).
Again, if this is the only method, this per unit charge is always positive, thus a tax. However, when
both instruments are employed, it is shown that the government may employ a tax on a successful
product and a subsidy on sampling, a subsidy on successful products and a tax on sampling, or a tax
on both. Factors determining which combination is selected include the nature of the uncertainty
(which has implications for strategic competition), the extent of information spillovers between
the two ￿rms, the value of the ￿nal product, and costs to both the ￿rm (for sampling) or the
government (for conservation).
The equilibrium examined here is subgame perfect. Section 3 describes the (simultaneous) com-
petition between the two ￿rms in the second stage of the game, given the government tax/subsidy
instruments. Section 4 considers the selection of the instruments to maximize rent extraction by
the government. Finally, section 5 provides concluding remarks.
3 Uncertainty, spillovers, and the sampling intensity of the two
￿rms
Each ￿rm selects its desired sampling intensity s, but its overall R&D level depends on the degree
of spillovers from the foreign ￿rm as well as on a random variable. With the exogenous percentage
of information lost to the other ￿rm and gained from the other ￿rm denoted by ￿ (0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1) and
the random variable denoted by ", the realized sampling intensity of ￿rm i is given by
Si = si + ￿sj + "i (1)
and the realized sampling intensity of the foreign ￿rm j is given by
Sj = sj + ￿si + "j; (2)
where "i and "j are identically and independently distributed. The distribution function of ", which
is twice di￿erentiable, is given by F("), with the ￿rst derivative, denoted by f("), representing the
density function. As in Zhou, the R&D choice shifts the density function without changing its other
properties.13 The winner of the R&D competition is the ￿rm with the higher realized sampling
13The uncertainty in Bagwell and Staiger alters the density function of production costs. For more detail on the
speci￿cation chosen here, see Zhou.
6intensity, in the same manner as in a labor tournament analysis of the type in Lazear and Rosen
(1981).
For ￿rm i to win, its realized sampling intensity Si must be larger than that of the competing
￿rm Sj, or equivalently
(1 ￿ ￿)(si ￿ sj) + "i > "j; (3)
so that the probability of developing the successful product is F((1 ￿ ￿)(si ￿ sj) + "i) for a given
"i: Over all possible values of "i, the expected probability of developing the successful product is
R ￿ "
" F((1￿￿)(si ￿sj)+"i)f(")d"; where " and ￿ " are the lower and upper bounds of the distribution
function. Given the government’s instruments t and p, ￿rm i’s expected pro￿ts are
￿i = (1 ￿ t)￿ v
Z ￿ "
"
F((1 ￿ ￿)(si ￿ sj) + "i)f(")d" ￿ c(si) ￿ psi; (4)
that is, the expected value of the successful product (net of any royalty) less sampling costs and
per unit charges. Maximizing this expected pro￿t yields the ￿rst-order condition for ￿rm i
(1 ￿ t)(1 ￿ ￿)￿ v
Z ￿ "
"
f((1 ￿ ￿)(si ￿ sj) + "i)f(")d" ￿ c0(si) ￿ p = 0; (5)
whereby the ￿rm samples up to the point where the additional expected value of the successful
product, net of taxes (or subsidies) and spillovers, from the greater likelihood of winning the
competition, equals the sum of the marginal sampling cost and per unit charge.14 The reaction










￿(1 ￿ t)(1 ￿ ￿)2￿ v
R ￿ "
" f0((1 ￿ ￿)(si ￿ sj) + "i)f(")d"
(1 ￿ t)(1 ￿ ￿)2￿ v
R ￿ "
" f0((1 ￿ ￿)(si ￿ sj) + "i)f(")d" ￿ c00(si)
: (6)
By virtue of the second-order condition for a maximum, the denominator of (6) is negative. Firm
i’s reaction function is therefore negatively sloped when f0 > 0, is perfectly horizontal (and thus
independent of sj) when f0 = 0, and is positively sloped when f0 < 0: When the two ￿rms’ sampling
intensities move in the same direction (f0 < 0), the two inputs are strategic complements; when
the sampling intensities move in opposite directions (f0 > 0), the inputs are strategic substitutes.15
14The second-order condition depends on the sign of f
0 and is therefore not automatically satis￿ed. The assumption
made here is that marginal costs are increasing at a su￿cient rate and/or ￿ is su￿ciently large to satisfy the second-
order condition for a maximum.
15Bulow et al. (1985) describe in detail strategic complementarity and substitutability in R&D competition. In
summary, strategic substitutability in R&D refers to a situation where a ￿rm increases its pro￿ts by reducing R&D
spending in response to an increase in its competitor’s spending on R&D; equivalently, strategic complementarity
occurs when a ￿rm’s pro￿ts increase when the ￿rm spends more on R&D in response to an increase in spending on
R&D by its competitor.
7Globally monotonic density functions include the exponential (f0 < 0), the uniform (f0 = 0), and
the power (f0 > 0) distributions. As in Zhou, the sign of f0 can be interpreted as an indication
of the prevalence of opportunities available in the market, with higher values suggesting greater
opportunities.
The foreign ￿rm has the same cost function but is assumed to face no taxes or per-unit charges,
so that its expected pro￿ts are
￿i = ￿ v
Z ￿ "
"
F((1 ￿ ￿)(sj ￿ si) + "j)f(")d" ￿ c(sj) (7)
and sj is chosen according to
(1 ￿ ￿)￿ v
Z ￿ "
"
f((1 ￿ ￿)(sj ￿ si) + "j)f(")d" ￿ c0(sj) = 0; (8)
which is equivalent to (5) without taxes or per unit charges.
Conditions (5) and (8) describe the outcome of the second stage of the game, given the govern-
ment’s taxes set in the ￿rst stage (examined below). The sensitivity of the second stage equilibrium
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￿11 = (1 ￿ t)(1 ￿ ￿)2￿ v
Z ￿ "
"
f0((1 ￿ ￿)(si ￿ sj) + "i)f(")d" ￿ c00(si); (10)
which is negative by the second-order condition of ￿rm i’s pro￿t maximization,
￿12 = ￿(1 ￿ t)(1 ￿ ￿)2￿ v
Z ￿ "
"
f0((1 ￿ ￿)(si ￿ sj) + "i)f(")d"; (11)
￿21 = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)2￿ v
Z ￿ "
"
f0((1 ￿ ￿)(sj ￿ si) + "j)f(")d"; (12)
and
￿22 = (1 ￿ ￿)2￿ v
Z ￿ "
"
f0((1 ￿ ￿)(sj ￿ si) + "j)f(")d" ￿ c00(sj); (13)
which is negative by the second-order condition of ￿rm j’s pro￿t maximization. The signs of the
o￿-diagonal elements of the Jacobian depend on whether the two inputs are strategic substitutes
or strategic complements. When the sampling intensities of the two ￿rms are substitutes, the o￿-
diagonals are both negative; when the sampling intensities of the two ￿rms are complements, the
8o￿-diagonals are both positive. For stability, the determinant of the Jacobian (denote by j￿j) is
assumed to be strictly positive as in Bagwell and Staiger.
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which is negative regardless of the sign of f0. The e￿ect of an increase in the royalty on the sampling










depends, however, on the relation between si and sj (that is, on the sign of f0).
Proposition 1 An increase in the tax rate on successful products in country i will increase country
j’s sampling intensity i￿ f0 > 0:
If the reaction function is negatively sloped (strategic substitutes), a higher royalty on ￿rm i
results in less domestic sampling and more sampling by ￿rm j. This has the e￿ect of signi￿cantly
reducing the probability that ￿rm i is successful in the competition. If the reaction function is how-
ever positively sloped (strategic complements), the higher royalty reduces the sampling intensities
of both ￿rms, thus having less of an impact on the probability that ￿rm i is successful. For the same
royalty rate, the government’s expected revenues are then lower under strategic substitutability.




(1 ￿ ￿)2￿ v
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" f0(￿j)f(")d" ￿ c00(sj)
j￿j
; (16)









which, like the royalty, is positive when f0 > 0 and is negative when f0 < 0. In the section that
follows, these sensitivities are used to determine the optimal government’s choices of t and p.
94 Rent extraction and the choice of taxes
According to the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, gov-
ernments must protect their biological resources. The commonly cited di￿culty in achieving such
an objective is ￿nding a source of funding. In addition to the recovery of biodiversity protection
￿nancing costs from bioprospecting, the government must take into account the impacts that its
policies have on the likelihood the prospecting ￿rm ￿nds a successful product. In another way, the
government must recognize the reactions of the sampling intensities of both ￿rms from the second
stage of the game in setting its own policies. The objective of the government is then to maximize
the expected total revenues extracted from the ￿rms, either through royalties or per-unit charges,
subject to the constraint that ￿rms act in accordance with the above detailed second-stage results.
Consistently with Simpson et al., the social, ecological, moral or aesthetic values of biodiversity are
ignored, as are the bene￿ts of habitat protection (including ecotourism and recreation), so that the
focus here is strictly on prospecting incentives.
Providing the samples to ￿rm i has a cost e(si) with e0 > 0 and e00 ￿ 0: This cost could relate to
the actual provision of the samples or to the cost of preserving an area large enough to encompass
enough species to meet the demand. The government thus maximizes its expected net revenues
R = t￿ v
Z ￿ "
"
F((1 ￿ ￿)(si ￿ sj) + "i)f(")d" ￿ e(si) + psi (18)
with respect to both t and p, subject to the second-stage reaction functions of ￿rms i and j. This
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+ si = 0 (20)
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Proposition 2 A tax on successful products is more likely to be positive when the marginal cost of
sampling is low, the degree of spillovers between ￿rms (￿) is low, the value of a successful product
(￿ v) is high, and the two R&D inputs are stronger strategic substitutes (that is, f0 is higher).
The tax on successful products lowers domestic ￿rm’s R&D e￿orts, thereby reducing the success
probability of the domestic ￿rm (increasing in extent with the value of f0). Low sampling costs
and spillovers, or high product values, instead lead to high R&D and a high success probability
From (20), the relationship between p and t can be written as
p =
￿t(1 ￿ ￿)￿ v
R ￿ "












where t is given by (21). The ￿rst conclusion that can be drawn is that, if there is only to be one
instrument (either a tax on successful products or a tax on sampling but not both), then the tax is
certainly positive. This follows directly from the objective of revenue extraction of the government.
Related to this, if one instrument is a subsidy, the other must be a tax. Again, this simply ensures
that the government has a positive revenue ￿ow. In general, however, a tax on successful products
can be combined with either a tax or a subsidy on sampling, and a tax on sampling can be combined
with either a tax or a subsidy on successful products.16
When the government applies a tax on sampling (p > 0), the conditions under which the
optimal royalty is negative depend on the sign of f0, or whether the R&D expenditures are strategic
complements or substitutes. A subsidy (rather than a royalty) on successful products is then the














is positive if f0 < 0, or negative if f0 > 0.
16In another way, there are three classes of possible outcomes with two non-zero instruments: t > 0 and p > 0,
t > 0 and p < 0, and p > 0 and t < 0.
11Proposition 3 If the two sampling intensties are strategic substitutes, a tax on sampling (p > 0)
would be more likely to be combined with a subsidy on successful products (t < 0) when the value
of a successful product (v) is low, marginal sampling costs (c0) are high, marginal protection costs
(e0) are high, and the degree of spillovers (￿) is high. However, the opposite is true if the two R&D
expenditures are strategic complements.
When the two expenditures are strategic substitutes, a lower product value or higher sampling
costs, protection costs, or spillovers imply that the resulting decreases in R&D by the home ￿rm
lead to increased R&D by the foreign ￿rm, thereby reducing the likelihood of success by the home
￿rm. This contributes to lower expected revenues from the product as well as from the R&D
tax. A product subsidy o￿sets these revenue decreases by encouraging sampling. With strategic
complements, a higher product value or smaller sampling costs, protection costs, or spillovers lower
both domestic sampling and foreign sampling, so that the likelihood of success does not change
substanitally. As a result, the home government is more likely to choose to subsidize an uncertain
success in return for higher R&D tax revenues from the higher sampling intensity.
In practice, royalty agreements have been employed to share pro￿ts between the ￿rms and the
source country, as intended by the Biodiversity Convention. Royalties are usually based on the
expected value of the potential product, with royalty ￿gures typically ranging from 1 to 7 percent.
Costa Rica’s Instituto Nacional de Biodiversidad (INBio) has signed agreements of this type with
pharmaceutical ￿rms Merck and Co., Eli Lilly and Co., and Bristol Myers Squibb in the search
for sources of new pharmaceuticals from samples from the diverse species of Costa Rica’s tropical
forests. The 1991 INBio-Merck agreement has been renewed three times.
It has here been shown that, although a positive tax (royalty) on successful ￿nds forces ￿rms to
sample fewer species than in the absence of regulation, this does not necessarily imply that the ￿rm
is less likely to win the R&D game presented here. The nature of the uncertainty may result in the
two R&D expenditures being strategic complements, so that foreign competitors reduce their own
expenditures when a domestic royalty is applied. In general, however, it is suboptimal for domestic
governments to only tax successful products, as a combination of taxes (or subsidies) on successful
products and sampling costs produce larger revenues than a single tax. It is not impossible for the
appropriate tax on successful products to be negative.
12What are the implications of this model for the viability of biodiversity prospecting as a source
of revenues for conservation? The limited data from existing agreements makes it di￿cult to
determine, particularly since existing contracts do not use all of the instruments prescribed here.
Further, the type of uncertainty faced by research ￿rms needs greater attention. Nonetheless, it is
not unreasonable to expect that a greater share of revenues could be extracted if the taxes were
chosen optimally. A number of studies, including Farnsworth and Soejarto (1985), Principe (1989),
McAllister (1991), Aylward (1993), and Barbier and Aylward have attempted to place values on
untested species in situ, with results ranging from US$44 to US$23.7 million. Barbier and Aylward
estimate the expected royalty per sample to be US$233, which implies (given the assumed 2 percent
royalty) that the expected net revenues per sample is $11650. Using their estimates (40 years, 2000
samples per year, 10 percent discount rate), the expected present value is almost $228 million, of
which only $4.6 million is extracted by the government in royalties. However, there is no reason
to believe that the chosen royalty is necessarily optimal. If the inputs of competing ￿rms are
strategic complements, signi￿cantly raising the royalty rate yields greater expected revenues to the
government. Per unit charges, or a combination of per unit charges and royalties, may be also be
a more attractive revenue-generating policy for governments.
5 Concluding Remarks
Many countries, particularly those at lesser stages of development, have become increasingly con-
cerned with the ability of biodiversity contracts to ￿nance conservation e￿orts. Initial agreement
attempts have employed royalties, or a tax on net revenues, as a means to this end, but the e￿ective-
ness of this method has been shown to be highly dependent on the nature of the uncertainty in the
R&D process and the spillovers that occur between ￿rms. In general, it is appropriate to combine
royalties and per unit charges (either of which, but not both, could in fact be subsidies instead of
taxes) as such a policy mix has the additional bene￿t of shifting some of the risk associated with
exploration onto those ￿rms performing the search.17
Some recent studies have suggested that low values of the \marginal species" necessarily imply
17Two of the most successful bioprospecting contracts are between INBio and Merck & Co. in Costa Rica (signed in
1991) and between Astra Zeneca and the Natural Product Discovery Unit at Gri￿th University in Australia (signed
in 1993). Both agreements involve a prospecting or research fee, which is however ￿xed rather than dependent on
the numbers of samples used, plus a royalty on any signi￿cant discovery made from bioprospecting.
13that biodiversity prospecting is a poor tool for conservation. Due to the extremely large num-
bers of species currently in existence, it is virtually uncontestable that private values from these
species is negligible and below their marginal protection cost, despite potentially high social values
not captured in market transactions. However, pharmaceutical patents often provide ￿rms with
substantial pro￿ts which exceed research and development, production, and distribution costs, so
that rent extraction may indeed be a viable option for governments desiring to ￿nance biodiversity
conservation.
Although it remains unclear based on the existing literature as to whether, and to what extent,
private-sector bioprospecting can be relied upon for the protection of biological diversity,18 bio-
prospecting can certaintly play a key role as an incentive-based or market-based revenue-generating
device for governments that have the responsibility of protecting such resources. The overriding
objective of the Convention on Biological Diversity is in fact sustainable development, which re-
quires a balance between economic development through the utilization of genetic resources and
conservation of biodiversity. To this end, the Convention recognizes national sovereignty over all
genetic resources and provides that access to valuable biological resources be carried out on \mu-
tually agreed terms" and subject to the \prior informed consent" of the country of origin. The
fair and equitable sharing of the bene￿ts arising out of the utilization of genetic resources is es-
pecially relevant to developing countries where most of the world’s biodiversity can be found in
that it contributes to fueling their economic and social development while reducing the ￿nancial
burden of biological conservation they face. Recent advances in bioprospecting methods, which
combine databases of natural history with ecological and evolutionary theory, to many industries
(e.g., biological control, bioremediation, construction engineering, shipping, environmental moni-
toring, mining, industrial materials, manufacturing, and environmental restoration) are also likely
to increase the economic bene￿ts from bioprospecting in the future as more species are identi￿ed
as useful.
The development of appropriate policy measures on, and contracts for, access and bene￿t-
18Estimated bioprospecting incentives range from $21/ha (Simpson et al.) to $9,177/ha (Rausser and Small, 2000).
The discrepancy in estimates may be attributable to better search processes resulting from improved information.
Recently, however, Costello and Ward (2006) show that the wedge between the two estimates ($21/ha and $9,177/ha)
is likely to be the outcome of di￿erent assumptions about the values of key parameters of the economic and biological
models used. Furthermore, based on more realistic and defensible assumptions about the values of these parameters,
they conclude, consistently with Simpson et al., that bioprospecting cannot provide su￿cient incentives for private-
sector biodiversity conservation.
14sharing requires however that consideration be given to uncertainty and information spillovers. In
the context of a two-￿rm R&D model, royalties are in fact found to lower the research output of
the taxed ￿rm, thus reducing the expected government’s revenues, when the research output of
the competing ￿rm is a strategic substitute as opposed to a strategic complement. Furthermore,
a policy mix consisting of a tax on sampling and a subsidy on any successful product is found
to be preferable, under certain parameter restrictions, when the two ￿rms’ R&D expenditures are
strategic substitues.
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